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Abstract 
Research into the corporate governance practices of small to medium sized private 
enterprises has been limited, as most of the current literature has focused on larger public 
corporations. Spectrum Resource Group Inc. (Spectrum) was utilized as the partner company 
in conducting this research, analysis and recommendations. 
The research focused on family, private, small to medium sized enterprises and employee 
owned companies to act as a foundation to analyze and compare to Spectrum's existing 
structure. 
This project focuses on the shareholder, director, manager relationships and the associated 
agency issues and costs. Furthermore, the project focuses on aligning appropriate incentives 
for different management levels considering both owner-managers and non-owner managers. 
Lastly, this research results in recommendations about the appropriate size, context and scope 
of board structures and director alignment. 
Overall it was found that incentives need to correspond to the type of job that is performed; 
smaller boards have significant advantageous over larger boards, and finally, that the 
positions of shareholder, director and manager need to be clearly delineated. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Spectrum Resource Group Inc. (Spectrum) is looking at solutions to improve its existing 
corporate structure with emphasis on separating and better aligning Shareholder, Director and 
Management duties and responsibilities. At present, the duties, rights and responsibilities of 
Shareholder, Director and Managers are not separated or clearly outlined within the 
shareholders' agreement or other company documents. Additionally, the relatively flat 
ownership structure has resulted in shareholdings that can be interpreted by owners as 
entitlement to certain perquisites and furthermore, rights that are not congruent with 
shareholder's actual legal rights. Included within this sense of entitlement is that 
shareholders may expect that ownership is compatible to directorship and senior management 
positions. 
Currently, existing Board of Director (BOD) meetings largely become manager meetings, 
and, as such, actual board discussion and motion ratification becomes lost in management 
topics. Further to this, other senior managers who are not shareholders or directors are being 
left out of management discussions, which include strategy making, project progress, crew 
movements, resource allocation, decision making and policy implementation. 
The purpose of this study is to review the literature in terms of similar types of companies 
and their corporate governance practices, and thus, make recommendations to Spectrum in 
how they can improve their governance structure and implementation. 
This will be completed by first, analyzing agency theory in relation to family, employee 
owned, and small to mediums size private (SME) businesses. Second, literature will be 
studied to see how these same types of businesses align and administrate their shareholders, 
directors and managers interests. The intent will be to determine if each level of 
responsibility is adequately incentivized and the appropriate responsibility maintained. 
Lastly, this study will review existing business practices, and moreover, the legal boundaries 
of the shareholder, director and manager, so that recommendations can be made to better 
align these levels. This will include exploring owner-manager entitlement issues, board size 
and scope and the splitting of Chairman and CEO roles. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Agency Theory 
Agency Theory, the Agency problem and associated costs, has been researched extensively 
over several decades. Primarily, the agency theory research has referred to public 
corporations where the Principal (shareholder) is clearly separated from the Agent 
(Manager). However, more recently this research focuses on private, family, and employee 
owned businesses in regards to agency issues, directors, board compilation, CEO and 
Chairman, and other organizational practices. 
Jensen & Meckling, (1976) state that Agency Theory is directed at the ever-present agency 
relationship, whereby one party (the principal) delegates work to another party (the agent), 
who performs that work (308). Kim and Nofsinger (2007, 3) note that "most shareholders do 
not wish to take part in a firm's business activities. These shareholders act like passive 
investors not active owners". Kim and Nofsinger (2007) go on to state that investors focus 
on the return and associated risk of their portfolios, while inside owners focus on the business 
performance of the firm (3). 
Boivie and others (2009) outline that one of the main ways to describe agency problems is 
that managers are "inherently self interested actors" that use corporate polices and resources 
to pursue individual goals and interests. Conversely, shareholders (owners) quite often have 
different agendas and motives; consequently, agency costs occur due to this divergence (1). 
Kim and Nofsinger (2007, 4) illustrate agency conflict with examples of "secretaries may 
take home office supplies. When travelling, mid-level manages may order as much food as 
allowed on their expense accounts". Kim and Nofsinger (2007) go on to state that all of 
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these actions are at the expense of the shareholders. To add, if employees/managers feel that 
they can get away with minor offenses, it begs the question, how far will they go (4)? 
Kim and Nofsinger (2007) go on to state that mid to higher level executives represent the 
highest risk to the company, in terms of agency costs, if these managers are not overseen by 
owners. Further, the authors argue that the best method to lessen the agency costs is for the 
owners to incorporate a monitoring system of managers and with the use of incentives. In 
other words, companies must align the profit of the shareholder to the profit of the 
executive/manager so that their desired outcomes become similar ( 4). This may include 
salary and bonuses, options, share grants and perquisites (12-20). However, these types of 
incentives bring about the potential of other problems related to manipulation of accounting 
by executives to increase profits and foregoing research and development to maximize short 
term profits (15-20). 
Boivie and others (2009) go on to argue that monitoring and the use of incentives are 
inherently extrinsic methods to reduce agency costs and control management, specifically 
referring to CEO behaviour. Furthermore, empirical research, more or less, while focusing 
on extrinsically based analysis, has neglected to pay any logical consideration on intrinsic 
based factors that may reduce a manager's tendency to pursue self-serving acts (2). 
Consequently, Boivie and others (2009) found that extrinsic constraints posed on managers 
are less necessary when the manager demonstrates a high degree of identification with the 
organization. That is to say, CEO's with higher organizational identification are principally 
concerned about the health of the organization rather than pursuing personal interests by 
exploiting the organizations resources for personal gain (3-4). Boivie and others (2009) then 
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concluded that with higher levels of organizational identification by the CEO, the agency 
problems and subsequent costs are reduced because the CEO is intrinsically motivated. 
Furthermore, by doing what is best for the company, the CEO is inherently doing what is best 
for themself (6) . 
Agency Theory can be illustrated and debated in several of the theoretical frameworks 
described below. These frameworks can be adapted to practical applications within business, 
whereby some of these theories are very apparent and useful in explaining behavior and 
outcomes of the principal and agent, while others may not be fit the particular situation. 
Following is what some of the research studies have found: 
Positivist Stream: 
In regard to Agency Theory, Eisenhardt (1989, 59) states that, "the Positivist research area 
focuses on identifying situations in which the principal and agent are likely to have 
conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the agents self 
serving behaviour." Further, positivist researchers have focused mainly on the relationship 
between the owners (shareholders) and the managers of public and private organizations 
(Berle & Means, 1932). Eisenhardt (1989) summarizes that in situations where senior 
managers and owners interests are different, there is significant evidence that agency 
problems exist and result in agency costs to the firm. Most notably in "takeover attempts, 
debt versus equity financing of projects, purchases and divestures (69). 
Eisenhardt (1989) explains that it is important to outline the differences between shareholder 
(investor) and manager policies and/or behaviours as a result of their differing motives, as 
described by the Principal-Agent conflict mentioned above. Furthermore, that the 
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implementation of information systems and outcome based contracts can align managerial 
practices with owner desires and thus minimize the positivist agency conflict (68). 
Principal - Agent Stream: 
Eisenhardt (1989) notes that, "the principal-agent stream is more directly focused on the 
contract between the principal and agent (69)". Conversely, Eisenhardt (1989) states that 
while the positivist research illustrates the basis that agency actually exists, the principal 
agent stream focuses on the best alternative of the contract alternative. For example, 
outcome based (commission) versus performance based (salary) illustrate ranges of contracts 
(69). In essence, Eisenhardt (1989) is indicating the method by which an employee or 
manager is compensated must be tailored to the type of job they are doing to reduce agency 
costs. If the job requires behavioral outcomes and actions, the contract should be 
performance based. If the job is centred on outcome based duties and responsibilities, the 
compensation should mirror an outcome based contract (commission) (69-70). 
The most common approach to these studies is to incorporate agency variables (task 
programmability, information systems and outcome uncertainty) to determine whether the 
contract is outcome based or behavior based. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that whether a person 
is an individual or agent, they will choose the most beneficial and efficient contract for their 
self interests ( 69). Further, Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that, when the contract between the 
principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the 
principal (68-69). 
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The following propositions result from the above discussion on Agency Theory; 
1. Agency problems exist in companies and result in significant agency costs, 
2. Agents have the propensity to put personal interests ahead of the corporation's, 
3. The appropriate alignment of incentives and company identity can minimize agency 
costs for the firm, 
4. Outcome versus Performance based contracts need to be considered and initiated. 
Family Owned Businesses (Private) 
As a comparison to Spectrum's ownership structure (8 shareholders), stze and format 
(owner-manager), family private business literature was reviewed for research in regards to 
whether agency problems exist or not, and how these family firms are corporately structured. 
Although the shareholders and directors of Spectrum are not family related they are, in fact, 
inside directors and shareholders, which closely resemble many family private firms. 
Dandridge ( 1979) argues that the theories of family policies and business models more 
closely resemble small business practices than large public businesses. Family business (like 
small business) lacks the interchangeability of the owners, which impacts the decision 
making ofthe manager and board. That is to say, public company shareholders can sell their 
shares on the open market, which is not applicable for family private firms (55). 
To begin, it is important to delineate the differences between outside ownership (public 
firms) and inside ownership (private firms). Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2003) state that 
the motivations of each of these demographic are diametrically opposed. First, outside 
owners prefer projects that are growth orientated, because as outside owners they only 
benefit from an increase in shareholder value. Further, these outside owners are somewhat 
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indifferent to the risk of a particular firm because they have the ability to hold diversified 
portfolios to spread their risk across several investments (179) . 
To add, Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2003) argue that inside owners who manage a private 
family firm do not have the same ability to diversify, therefore they evaluate risks differently. 
In other words, these inside owners evaluate projects and risk taking proportionate with their 
individual preferences for particular outcomes. These outcomes are not only financial, but 
also include non-financial considerations and are further impacted by the inside owner's 
ability to influence strategy, implement authority and by choice of which projects to take 
(179). Being that agency costs are prevalent in outside ownership firms between the principal 
(shareholder) and agent (manager), it begs the question if these same agency costs exist in 
private family firms. This will be explored below. 
Chrisman, Chua, Litz (2004), argue that issues relating to altruism can result in agency costs 
within smaller sized private family firms. Problems relating to owner-managers that misuse 
their power by exploiting company expense accounts and/or permit shirking by family 
members are higher in these types of firms (337). However, it is also argued that in certain 
situations these types of behaviours may represent an agency cost in public firms, but not in 
private family firms. For example, Chrisman, Chua, Litz (2004, 337), "if a family decides 
that providing jobs for its less able member is in its interest and management does provide 
the jobs, there is consumption of perks, which would be an agency cost in a non-family firm, 
but not in a family firm". 
Chrisman, Chua, Litz (2004) state that agency costs in smaller private firms can occur even if 
there is no manager present. This can occur as simply as an employee shirking on their 
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responsibilities of simple record keeping that results in performance gaps that cost the firm. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the company is privately held and owner-managed, agency 
costs exist within firms (342). 
Schulze and others (200 1) posit that although it can mitigate self-interest and foster loyalty 
and a long-term perspective, altruism can also alter the incentive structure of a firm in that 
some of the agency benefits gained are offset by free-riding and other agency costs. The 
authors also argue that a sense of entitlement can exist among family members and insiders 
that would not exist in a public corporation and furthermore, the CEO's entitlement may 
stretch to offer employment, perquisites and other privileges that would not otherwise occur. 
Further, fractional ownership (similar to public firms) in family firms does not minimize the 
above agency costs; in fact, it may aggravate it (108-111). 
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2003) go on to argue that inside ownership does not minimize 
agency costs. Furthermore, inside ownership by family firms and their respective boards, in 
fact, exhibit many agency problems that are akin to privately managed firms. Inside owners 
have their own motivations and interests that may not be congruent with other board 
members and the company. Some Board members may be motivated by wealth creation 
within the organization, while another maybe motivated by leisure. Therefore, these internal 
conflicts create their own agency problems in the firm. Conversely, in public corporations, 
external governance mechanisms exist to protect the firm that does not exist in privately held 
companies (181 ). 
Chrisman, Chua, Litz (2004) go on to identify some steps that that can be taken by the firm's 
board to minimize agency costs, altruism and free-riding within a private family firm. First, 
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regular performance reports can correct performance gaps before they become larger and 
more significant. Next, strategic planning can prevent opportunistic behavior by clearly 
outlining and formalizing projections, cost estimates and performance goals (342-343). 
The following propositions result from the above discussion on Family Owned Businesses; 
1. Outside owners generally prefer more risk because they can hold diversified 
portfolios, 
2. Inside owners evaluate risk differently because they cannot simply tender their shares 
on a public stock exchange, 
3. Agency costs exist in family owned firms and may even be more pronounced than in 
public firms, 
4. Potential problems in family owned firms relate to altruism, shirking and free-riding. 
Employee Ownership (Private) 
Spectrum's shareholders are also all employees of the firm. In essence, albeit that 
Spectrum's shareholders are also currently senior managers of the firm, they are employees, 
and, therefore, Spectrum could be considered an employee owned firm. What makes this 
pertinent to research is the fact that Spectrum is exploring a broader share base for 
employees. 
Bradley, Estrin and Taylor (1990), in summanzmg the potential effects of employee 
ownership and profit sharing, outlined that even in cases where companies are partially 
owned it reduces the company's efficiency. By reducing efficiency, the authors argue that 
the firm is forced to indoctrinate workers' objectives into its strategy which distorts the 
company's efforts away from maximizing profit (387). 
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Bradley, Estrin and Taylor (1990) go on to claim that employee ownership creates free-rider 
problems. For example, there is only fractional benefit to the employee in terms of profit 
sharing compared to additional individual effort required. Therefore, the incentives and pay 
to employees do not match the individual effort desired from the company (388). Cooper, 
Dyck and Frohlich (1992) also argue that employees only receive a fractional amount of the 
profits generated be increasing individual performance; therefore, the linkage between 
incentive and increase of performance is weak (472). Consequently, Cooper, Dyck and 
Frohlich (1992) state that employees may actually free-ride by shirking on their own 
responsibilities and rely on the group's productivity to complete work (472). 
Bradley, Estrin and Taylor (1990), argue that in public or owner-managed firms, the manager 
is responsible for monitoring and maintaining the effort levels of the employees. Further, the 
shareholders are external to the company, and are thus responsible for ensuring that the 
managers are held accountable, largely by share price and their ability to create pressure by 
selling shares or being taken over. In employee owned firms this becomes more difficult, as 
the threat of a takeover does not really exist and employees are less informed on the best uses 
of its capital, compared to public firms that are constantly being evaluated by shareholders, 
analysts, and boards (388). 
Bradley, Estrin and Taylor (1990) also state that employee owned firms are limited by their 
equity holdings for growth. Public firms can raise more capital by issuing more shares 
publicly to raise capital and invest. This becomes more restrictive for employee owned firms 
(388-89). Bradley, Estrin and Taylor (1990, 389) state that, "employee ownership and profit 
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sharing could theoretically lead to lower rates of growth, lower productivity, poor decision 
making, and internal inefficiency". 
In an alternative view on employee versus conventionally owned firms, Frohlich and others 
(1998) offer a much different view than Bradley, Estrin and Taylor (1990). In a research 
project completed by Frohlich and others (1998), they focused on companies that were fully 
employee owned, and as such, not only enjoyed the economic returns associated with 
shareholdings, but also had the responsibility of the governance and distribution of the 
company. Further, the employees in these situations had the dual responsibility of 
determining the subordinates either directly or through delegation and moreover, what 
incentive measure would be instituted (312-313). 
Frohlich and others (1998, 321) found overall that "subjects in the employee-owned firms 
exhibited higher productivity, perceived greater fairness in the pay they received and in the 
method that was used to pay them, reported higher levels of involvement in their task, 
assigned more positive evaluations to their superiors and showed a greater propensity to 
interact with, and provide assistance to, their co-workers." To add, Frohlich and others 
( 1998) found that in employee owned firms, the supervisory obligations were less than for 
conventional firms (321). Overall, Frohlich and others (1998, 321) state that, "our findings 
suggest that employee ownership may indeed have potential micro-level advantages over 
conventional ownership." 
Frohlich and others (1998) go on to claim that in this study, the employees had legal control 
over governance and distributive issues, for example, the employees were involved in the 
selection process of choosing their supervisors. The authors argue that the employee's ability 
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to actually participate m the decision making process may explain improved results by 
employee owned firms rather than the ownership status (321-322). In that sense, it may be 
possible to mimic employee ownership with workgroups in conventionally owned firms, and 
thus, get the same results. In any case, it leaves credence that the establishment of employees 
based firms over conventionally owned firms has its benefits and performance can be 
increased (322). 
The following propositions result from the above discussion on Employee-owned businesses; 
1. Agency issues exist in regard to shirking and free-rider problems in employee owned 
businesses which are related to; insignificant incentive to increase performance and 
the lack of ability to influence management, 
2. Employee owned business have constraints to growth due to limitations of capital, 
3. Conversely, separate research found employee owned firms had higher productivity, 
required less supervision and in situations where the employees were able to 
participate in decision making, the company had improved results. 
Directors 
Focus on Board structure including responsibilities and duties will centre on research that 
focuses on small to medium sized private companies. Large and public companies take up 
most of the research in the literature, and most authors recognize that more studies need to 
occur m regards to private ownership, boards and small to medium sized enterprises 
(SME's). 
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Kim and Nofsinger (1989) point out that a board should be charged with the following five 
general functions ( 41 ): 
1. to hire, evaluate and perhaps even terminate top management; 
2. to vote on major operating proposals from management; 
3. to vote on major operating financial decisions; 
4. to offer expert advice to management; 
5. to ensure the reporting to shareholders is accurate. 
Yates (2006, 187) illustrates the following responsibilities of the Directors of a Corporation: 
Directors approve all of the important decisions with respect to the operation of the corporation. 
Directors are the ultimate decision-makers and essentially the alter ego of the corporation, and 
they are only answerable to the shareholders in the sense that they must face re-election. Directors 
must function at a high standard when performing their responsibilities. 
The Business Corporations Act (1990) indicates that directors are required to "exercise the 
care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances (134 (1) b)". Yates, (2006) points out that the obligation of the directors is 
owed to the company, rather than the shareholders. Further, a shareholder cannot sue a 
director for causing a loss due to their negligence or misconduct; they can only bring about 
an action on behalf of the corporation. In other words, only the corporation can sue a 
director ( 187). 
The Business Corporations Act (1990) states that directors must "act honestly and in good 
faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation (134 (1) a)". Yates (2006, 188), 
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further illustrates that "the director has a fiduciary duty, which is owed to the corporation, 
rather than the shareholders." Yates (2006) indicates that this includes putting the interests 
of the company ahead of an individual director' s best interests. Any business propositions 
that may surface to a particular director, because of their position within the corporation, 
belong to the company. In the event that a director is in conflict, he must divulge that 
conflict to the other directors. Directors who accept bribes, kickbacks, secret profits are in 
breach of their fiduciary duty and such activity constitutes a criminal offense (188). 
Kim and Nofsinger (2007) note that the directors have a "duty of supervision" in which the 
company requires a code of ethics, which the directors must ensure is maintained, and 
furthermore that the directors are providing full disclosure. Additionally, the directors should 
meet regularly to review the Company's performance, management, operations and ensure 
that the financial statements are prepared accurately and appropriate audits are in place ( 42). 
Yates (2006) indicates that Directors also have a statutory obligation in that they protect the 
capital of the corporation so that creditors are paid, remit GST, PST, employment insurance, 
income tax and workers compensation premiums. Further, Directors can be held responsible 
for several months of unpaid employee wages, environmental damage and direct liability for 
fraud or criminal activity (188-89). 
Yates (2006) indicates that only where the directors demonstrated due diligence (taking 
reasonable steps) can they avoid the liabilities and responsibilities illustrated above. Further, 
most companies now put policies and procedures in place to educate and train directors from 
making mistakes (189-90). 
15 
Board of Directors 
In their research of 2,365 private U.S corporations of fewer than 500 employees (smaller to 
medium size firms), Fiegener and others (2000) found, on average, these companies had 
boards with 4.6 directors (including the CEO). Of these firms, 58.9% of the firms reported 3 
or 4 directors on their respective boards, and 31.4% had 5 or 6 directors on their boards (12-
15). 
Fiegener and others (2000) found a positive relationship between the minority interest held 
by the CEO and outside directors sitting on the board of directors. In other words, the 
minority shareholding CEO was not impacted, nor did he/she feel threatened by the inclusion 
of outside directors (independent) in small privately held firms. Conversely, majority 
shareholding CEO's were resistant to the addition of an outside director to sit on the board in 
small private corporations (17). Consequently, Fiegener and others (2000) argue that 
majority owning CEO's are more inclined to add a family member or existing manager 
(dependent director) to the board over adding an outside director (17). 
Huse (1994) claims that the structure of a classical board in larger firms (public and private) 
focuses on the actual independence of the board from the managers that run the firm - as 
Agency Theory recommends (55-65). That is to say, Huse (1994, 65) states that "Agency 
Theory recommends "independence" in board-management relationships to increase board 
performance and company performance". 
However, Huse (1994) argues that in smaller firms (owner-manager) both independence and 
interdependence of the board-manager relationship can positively impact the monitoring of 
the company by the board (63). In essence, Huse (1994, 65) maintains that the "highest 
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performance will be achieved with simultaneous independence and interdependence -
distance and closeness". 
Huse (1994) posits that the practical implications of evaluating the relationship between 
boards and their managers in smaller firms can be illustrated in a continuum of the 
independent and independence between the managers and the board as illustrated below (63-
65): 
Figure 1: Relating Interdependence with Independence of Boards 
Independence 
(Large Firms) Best Company Performance 
"Independent Board" "Participatory Board" 
Worst Company (Small Firms) 
Performance 
"Understanding Board" 
"Laissez faire Board" 
Low Interdependence High 
Huse (1994) states that an "independent" board's function is to hire, fire and hold 
management accountable to the shareholders and other stakeholders and that quite often they 
do not have constructive relations with management. As such, "independent" boards 
generally are not successful in smaller firms (65). Huse (1994) also notes that it is common 
for boards in smaller owner-managed firms to quite often align the corporate governance 
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mechanisms towards the "understanding" boards listed above, whereby the emphasis of the 
boards is to the main stakeholder, which is the manager (65). 
Consequently, Huse (1994) argues that smaller firms should be set up with "participatory" 
boards and that such boards can perform a dual function of supporting managers and 
monitoring on behalf of other stakeholders ( 66). Huse (1994, 66) believes that "in the 
owner-manager situation, the manager will listen to and heed to the potential critics from the 
board because of their mutual trust." 
Huse (1994) contends that a "participatory" board should recognize all ofthe stakeholders in 
evaluating the direction and governance procedures of the firm. These stakeholders include, 
but are not limited to, banks, managers, creditors, employees, communities and governmental 
agencies, which all have a vested interest in a smaller firm and should in themselves be 
advocates of a participatory board (66). 
Kim and Nofsinger (2007) claim that smaller boards can more effectively enhance 
shareholder value, and moreover, circumvent issues with free-rider problems. Larger boards 
can result in trouble reaching consensus, shirking responsibility to other directors and making 
it difficult in getting meaningful results. Conversely, smaller boards can be more dynamic, 
active and result in more effort due to the inclination that fewer are monitoring the firm ( 4 7). 
Brunninge, Nordqvist and Wiklund (2007) indicate that assessing governance mechanisms in 
small to medium sized firms (SMEs ), as compared to larger public firms, are very different, 
particularly in regards to strategic change. The authors argue that owner-manager firms are 
generally limited to usually one person, the CEO, who is relied upon to react to 
18 
environmental conditions or provide advice on new or emerging opportunities. The authors' 
research indicates that this limitation in the SME's ability to adapt their strategy puts them at 
a competitive disadvantage compared to larger firms. The authors go on to argue that this 
limitation can be mitigated by the inclusion of outside directors on their respective boards or 
by broadening their top management teams (TMT) by including them in strategy formation. 
Being that most owner-manager operations are somewhat reluctant to add outside directors 
(albeit still an option), the addition of TMT's to assist with strategy facilitation can be 
advantageous for the firm. At the same time, this shift in strategy management enables the 
board to keep their statutory and fiduciary obligations intact (302-305). 
The following propositions result from the above discussion on directors and the board of 
directors: 
1. Shareholders, directors and managers should be separated, as legally, and 
fundamentally their duties and boundaries are dissimilar, 
2. Directors can be legally and personally liable for their actions, and thus have a 
fiduciary and statutory obligation, 
3. Shareholders are protected by limited liability and can hold directors accountable 
through election, 
4. Boards of Directors are more efficient and can be held more accountable when they 
are smaller in size. Further, the board needs to be balanced between being 
interdependent but also independent, whereby a participatory board is best, 
5. Boards should govern and the top management team needs to be incorporated into 
strategy building within firms. 
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Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer 
Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli (2007) argue that the CEO's responsibility is to oversee and 
drive the day to day operations of the firm by guiding its employees, while the Chairperson 
of the board only leads the directors of the firm at board meetings. The board of directors 
represents the highest decision making unit in the firm, but the chairperson is not at the top of 
the decision hierarchy within the board, unlike the CEO who has authority over the 
subordinates working in the firm (24). 
Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli (2007) indicate the CEO's role is dual, in that the CEO is 
responsible for the implementation of decisions handed down by the board, but also 
responsible for decision making on day to day operations. Conversely, the Chairperson does 
not carry additional authority and is part of an equal team of the directors, and each share the 
responsibility of board tasks. This makes the Chairperson's job somewhat more challenging, 
in that they must bring the board together not as individuals, but as a unified and cooperative 
team (24-25). 
Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli (2007) illustrate that the difference between the CEO and 
Chairman can be summarized as follows which resembles the characteristics of team 
leadership put forth by Yukl (1989) illustrated on the following page: 
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Figure 2: Comparison of CEO and Chairperson Leadership 
CEO Board Chairperson 
Accountable to shareholders and a broader set of 
Accountable to the Board of Directors stakeholders together with the other board 
members 
Responsible for implementing decisions made The highest level of decision making in the firm 
by the board together with the other board members 
Placed at the top of a hierarchy (formally and Leads a team of equal peers (formally and 
socially) socially) 
Leads subordinates on a continuous basis, 
Leads board meetings that generally take place 
generally with frequent contact with 
with infrequent intervals 
subordinates 
Has instruction authority Does not have instruction authority over the other 
board members 
Generally a full-time leader Generally a part-time leader of the board 
Elson (2004) posits that splitting the roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board carry some 
substantial risks that need to be considered. That is to say, by having split centres of power it 
can cloud the lines of authority and create problems with subordinates. For example, a 
dissatisfied or go-getting employee may be tempted to avoid the CEO and go directly to the 
Chairman regarding controversial managerial decisions. This may undermine a unified 
message and cause discipline problems. Actual board effectiveness presents another concern. 
Board members might be enticed to rely on the Chairman for overseeing management, and 
thus, be more inclined to engage in their own responsibilities with less care (22). 
Elson (2004) goes on to argue that companies should worry less about who fills the chair 
position and focus more on governing the managers (22) . 
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The following propositions result from the above discussion on the Chairman and CEO: 
1. The literature is mixed on whether the positions of Chairman and CEO should be 
separated. The splitting of these roles actually may create problems for subordinates 
lacking direction as to who is actually managing the firm, 
2. The Chairman's role is to facilitate the directors at board meetings. Conversely, the 
CEO is responsible for implementing board resolutions, and moreover, the CEO also 
needs to make their own decisions in leading management and staff. 
Shareholders 
Yates (2006) illustrates that the membership of a corporation 1s comprised of its 
shareholders. Albeit separate from the corporation, the shareholders have the right to vote at 
shareholder meetings based on their share holdings. The supervision of the managers within 
the corporation is under the responsibilities of the directors, who are voted in by the 
shareholders. Shares can be in the form of first, common shares, which generally give the 
right to vote and share in dividends. Second, preferred shares, which generally do not have 
voting rights, but have dividend rights that supersede the dividend right of common 
shareholders. However, neither the preferred or common shareholders have a legal right to a 
dividend ( 181 ). 
Yates (2006) goes on to state that, at some point, if the preferred shareholders have been 
promised dividends but do not receive them, they can obtain voting rights and, ultimately, 
have a voice in terms of the operations of the company. Other classes of shares can be set up 
for estate purposes such as participating shares, voting and non-voting, that fulfill specific 
needs within a corporation (181). 
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Yates (2006) illustrates that one of the key benefits of being a shareholder of corporation is 
the limited liability born by shareholders. As Yates notes (2006, 182) since the corporation, 
"is a separate legal personality, any debts, liabilities, or other obligations of the corporation 
are those of the corporation itself, not the shareholders". Yates (2006) goes on to illustrate 
that under normal conditions these liabilities will not be imposed on the shareholders, unless 
there is evidence of fraud, corruption, deceit or other wrong that the shareholder(s) were 
involved ( 182). 
Yates (2006) also notes that shareholders and ownership are somewhat misleading terms. 
The shareholders do not actually own the corporation or its associated assets (183-84). Yates 
(2006, 184) states that "the shares only give the shareholder control of the corporation 
through voting". Therefore, only on dissolution of the company can the shareholder lay 
claim to the assets; however, other creditors may lay additional claims (184). 
Yates (2006) illustrates a number of shareholder rights that include (184-86): 
1. Right to share in the assets if the company is dissolved 
2. Right to inspect financial records 
3. Other mechanisms to prevent the company from abuse: 
a. Potentially the right to dissent if elected directors institute major changes and 
it has a negative impact the minority shareholder(s) or the company 
b. Protection from oppression 
c. Preemptive rights in the event new shares are issued 
d. Representative or Derivative action 
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The following propositions result from the above discussion on the shareholders of a firm: 
1. Shareholders can exist in several levels, and thus, different levels of shareholdings are 
congruent to distinctive rights, 
2. Shareholders are protected by limited liability, and consequently, the liabilities of the 
firm will remain with the firm. 
Managers 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), as illustrated earlier, argued that conflict arises when separating 
ownership and control, which refers to the Principal-Agent problem and results in agency 
costs. These agency costs, as argued throughout this project, are not fully mitigated by 
family, private and employee ownership versus public ownership. Furthermore, an owner-
manager structure can exist in many forms, whereby for example, the manager(s) may be part 
of several shareholders, shareholders may not be manager(s) or manager(s) may exist that are 
not shareholders. This further complicates dealing with the agency conflicts, board structures 
and managerial duties. 
Yates (2006) states that similar to directors, managers must perform their duties with care, 
diligence and skill, moreover, act honestly, in good faith and in the best interests of the 
corporation. In other words, managers must operate with a fiduciary responsibility to the 
corporation and its best interests, not just their own (191). 
Kim and Nofsinger (2007) maintain that are two primary ways to align shareholder interests 
with managers needs. First is with the use of incentives, as discussed earlier, and the second 
is by monitoring. Monitoring in the sense that putting in place procedures to watch and 
scrutinize the manager's behavior ( 4). Kim and Nofsinger (2007) point out that one of the 
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best methods to monitor managers is through active monitoring by large shareholders who 
are active managers within the firm. In essence, these large shareholders have the incentive 
and power to keep an eye on other managers (94-95). 
Kim and Nofsinger (2007) illustrate other monitors, who are stakeholders, include 
accountants (internal and external), employees, creditors, banks and lawyers. Each of these 
stakeholders have an interest in the performance of the firm and to some extent hold 
managers accountable and monitor what is occurring within the firm ( 4-7). 
The following propositions result from the above discussion on the Managers of a firm: 
1. The managers are the agent of the firm, and similar to directors, managers have an 
obligation to the firm of a fiduciary nature, 
2. Implementing appropriate incentives to align manager interest with the firm's 
objectives is critical, 
3. Stakeholders can play a role in holding managers on task and accountable. 
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Chapter 3 Introduction to Spectrum 
Spectrum Resource Group Inc. (Spectrum) is a dynamic, fully-integrated forestry silviculture 
consulting and contracting company. Established in 1986, Spectrum's expertise has expanded 
and diversified within the full field of natural resource management. Spectrum's level of 
efficiency and professionalism has earned them a reputation for competence, quality, 
longevity and exceptional performance. 
Spectrum's head office is in Prince George, British Columbia and the company utilizes 
satellite offices out of Grande Prairie, Alberta and Chetwynd and Dawson Creek, British 
Columbia. Spectrum strategically locates its senior (Project) Managers in each of these 
locations to administrate existing operations and service clientele. This local presence 
enables Spectrum to capture opportunities by being proximal and available in the 
communities in which they work. Generally, Spectrum's workforce mobilizes throughout the 
operating areas based on the geographic location and the nature of the project. Appendix 1 
and 2 illustrate Spectrum's Operating Areas and office locations. 
The following paragraphs will outline Spectrum's services, illustrating the distinct nature and 
scope, while highlighting current industry trends. In evaluating Spectrum's corporate 
governance mechanisms, it is important to illustrate the diversity in which Spectrum 
operates, including the geographical extent of their operations. 
Forestry and Silviculture 
Spectrum historically has operated within the silviculture forestry industry of Canada, 
throughout the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta, but the company has also 
completed some projects in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 
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The practice of silviculture relates to all activities associated with the re-establishment of 
trees on a segment of land following timber harvesting. These services offered by Spectrum 
are organized into operational departments and include; 
• Forestry Vegetation Management 
o Herbicide Application 
o Stand Tending and Spacing 
• Forest Management 
o Silviculture surveys 
• Forest Health 
o Monitoring of insect population dynamics and spread characteristics 
o Population control activities within forested landscapes 
• Reforestation 
o Tree planting 
Trends 
Approximately 90% of forested land within Canada is owned by the crown and is 
administered and regulated under the jurisdiction of the provincial government of each 
province or territory. Although similarities exist in the policies and regulations governing 
forestry operations within each province, each province regulates its provincial forests in a 
slightly different manner. Unique provincial forestry policies and regulations have resulted 
in distinctive forest industries in each province with different competitors and different 
market forces influencing competitive interactions. 
The right to harvest timber is allocated in a unique fashion within each province, but without 
exception each province requires companies which harvest timber to re-establish a new stand 
of timber to a minimum specification. Within a basic set of timing and activity guidelines, 
each forestry company is free to decide how it chooses to re-establish a new stand of timber, 
as long as the required forest end-state is achieved within the required time frame. 
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The forest industry in Alberta and British Columbia are currently expenencmg umque 
challenges which have a profound effect on Spectrum's future business in silviculture. The 
current forest industry trend is toward less timber harvesting, which ultimately means a 
reduction of silviculture within each province which is due to a number of factors: 
1. Impact and devastation of the mountain pine beetle and subsequently the availability 
of lodge pole pine trees. The decline in harvesting results in less planting, brushing, 
herbicide and surveying contracts for Spectrum. 
2. Global economic recession that has meant less exporting of lumber by Canadian 
forest companies to a number of countries, primarily the United States. 
3. High Canadian currency rates in relation to the United States dollar, limiting exports 
of lumber to the United States, which are used for housing construction. 
4. Cumbersome and restrictive Softwood Lumber Agreement with the United States. 
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Consequently, in Canada and British Columbia specifically, sawmill closures (permanent and 
temporary) are currently prevalent with a number of forestry exporters. Further, there is a 
noticeable decline in harvesting within the regions in which Spectrum operates. A reduction 
in timber harvesting today will impact the amount of silviculture and forest management 
work for Spectrum in the future as less of their existing services will be required. 
Much of Spectrum's forestry and silviculture services are highly seasonal, for example, it 
operates from the months of April to October. However, Spectrum has been able to capture 
opportunities in Alberta in relation to the mountain pine beetle epidemic by providing 
consulting services for inventory counts of mountain pine beetle attack and subsequent 
control work. As a result, these services enable Spectrum to operate throughout the fall and 
winter and keep its employees working year round. 
Overall, some of Spectrum's services have already been severely impacted with the decline 
in timber harvesting, while other services are maintaining a high market share and 
performing well. Exhibit 2, below, includes the year to date cumulative cut (harvest in cubic 
metres), which further illustrates the decline in forestry and silviculture in British Columbia. 
Figure 4: Softwood Lumber Cumulative Cut in Cubic Metres (British Columbiai 










2 HBS - harvest billing system, prepared by Rob Scagel, M.Sc. 
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Non-Forestry Operations 
Spectrum also completes services outside of traditional forestry and silviculture in order to 
capture efficiencies of utilizing its existing physical and human resources. Spectrum has 
horizontally integrated by means of their resources into similar, but different industries. The 
clientele of these services includes cities, townships and regional districts. These services 
include: 
• Industrial Vegetation Management 
o Invasive and Noxious Weed Control (Cities and Regional Districts) 
o Right of Way Management (Utilities, Oil and Gas companies) 
• Fire Mitigation 
o Urban and rural 
• Mosquito Control 
o Urban and rural 
Energy sector companies involved with the extraction of Oil and Gas within Alberta and 
British Columbia are required to control vegetation levels on lease sites, pipelines and around 
infrastructure with the intent to reduce fire risk. Vegetation is controlled on pipelines to 
ensure that deep rooting trees and brush do not physically damage the pipeline. Spectrum 
completes several small to medium scale contracts with companies like Suncor (Petro 
Canada), Husky Energy and Talisman and is continuing to explore new opportunities, 
develop expertise and a further reputation in this field. 
Utility sectors like British Columbia Transmission Corporation (BCTC) and British 
Columbia Hydro (BC Hydro) manage vegetation to prevent encroachment on power lines, 
substations and other structures. Spectrum completes projects to monitor and treat these sites 
either manually with chain and brush saws, or utilizing herbicides with backpack and boom 
sprayers. 
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Spectrum also focuses on Industrial Vegetation Management with the Northwest and 
Northeast Invasive Plant Councils by inventorying and controlling invasive and noxious 
weeds. Invasive weeds threaten crops for farmers and put native species at risk and are 
controlled via the transportation corridors (highways and roads) in and around northern 
British Columbia. 
Spectrum also works with cities and townships managing mosquito control and completing 
beautification projects in relation to weed control of boulevards and parks. Further, 
Spectrum completes wildfire prescriptions and fire management around cities and townships 
in Alberta and British Columbia. 
Spectrum owns a share of Borealis Carbon Offsets Limited (Borealis), which is a company 
involved in the development of carbon sequestration projects, with the intent of selling into 
the voluntary and regulated markets. Spectrum provides services to Borealis in the 
development of projects in the form of consulting and contracting services. 
Spectrum is currently integrating into fire, wind and water restoration services in urban and 
rural locations, again by using its existing physical and human resources. The intent is to 
start a new company, owned by Spectrum, to operate primarily in the fall, winter and spring 
utilizing existing infrastructure. At this time of year, the restoration industry is its busiest 
dealing with floods, frozen pipes and wind damage, while conversely, Spectrum is usually 
less busy. 
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Figure 5: Spectrum's revenues by Department- Fiscal Year 20093 
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All of these non-forestry related projects have augmented Spectrum's diversity and increased 
revenues. While Spectrum's revenues have declined from 2008 to 2010, the diversification 
away from solely forestry related projects has been successful for the most part. Yet, in one 
instance, Spectrum attempted to own and then operate a saw-mill, which resulted in 
significant losses. The intent of this venture was to utilize raw logs from a fire mitigation 
project in the Robson valley and sell lumber overseas into niche markets. 
In 2004, Spectrum operated primarily in British Columbia and almost exclusively in forestry 
and silviculture. By 2008, Spectrum had doubled their revenues and expanded successfully 
into Alberta. By 2010/11 fiscals , 40% of Spectrum revenues were in Alberta and the 
company had diversified substantially, with 25 to 30% of revenues being outside of the 
traditional forestry and silviculture industries. 
3 Spectrum Internal Company Documents 
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Figure 6 below illustrates Spectrums revenues over the past 7 years (2004 to 2010 fiscals), 
including a forecasted 2011 fiscal. Even with the present downturn in the forestry industry, 
Spectrum has remained profitable and anticipates a rebound in their revenues with current 
revenue projections and projects already under contract4 . 
Figure 6: Spectrum Revenue (in millions) 
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Existing Executive Structure 
Spectrum has 8 shareholders who have different share amounts and moreover, the company, 
as noted earlier, utilizes a relatively flat hierarchal structure. Each Spectrum shareholder 
currently has a seat on the board of directors. To add, each Director is also a Senior Manager 
(Project Manager) of the company, whose primary responsibility is to service clients, 
generate revenue and oversee projects. The full scope of the Project Managers 
responsibilities will be discussed later in this document. 
4 Spectrum Internal Company Documents 
33 
Appendix 3 illustrates Spectrum's full organization chart, however, the diagram below 
illustrates a simplified example of the operations structure, not including support services. 
Shareholder/Director-? CE0-7 Project Manager-? Supervisor-7Crewleader-7 Worker 
In essence, each shareholder, director and Project Manager is wearing multiple hats and has 
several responsibilities. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is a director and a shareholder, 
and consequently has Project Managers who are also directors and shareholders report to 
him. Conversely, some Project Managers and other senior managers, which are not directors 
and shareholders, also report to the CEO. 
Figure 7 below demonstrates the current shareholder ownership levels and years of 
experience as a shareholder within Spectrum. As mentioned earlier, each shareholder is 
currently a director and has a seat at the board of directors table. 
Figure 7: Shareholder Ownership Level 
Year of Ownership 
Shareholder experience Level 
Shareholder 1 24 5% 
Shareholder 2 24 15% 
Shareholder 3 10 15% 
Shareholder 4 10 15% 
Shareholder 5 5 15% 
Shareholder 6 4 15% 
Shareholder 7 3 15% 
Shareholder 8 2 5% 
Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors (BOD) is responsible for establishing general corporate policy, 
strategy and operational direction. Major policy and financial decisions with corporate wide 
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ramifications are also brought forward to the BOD for discussion and ratification. The BOD 
is currently chaired by the CEO, who facilitates and tracks the actions of the BOD and acts as 
an information and leadership hub, overseeing Spectrum's day to day operations. The CEO 
has no direct operational responsibilities in terms of generating revenue by working on 
projects. However, the CEO acts to ensure that company resources (physical and human) are 
allocated and activities are completed in a coordinated, efficient and cost effective manner by 
the various Project Managers and Supervisors. The organizational structure of Spectrum 
dictates that the CEO answers to the BOD, and the directors who are all shareholders, report 
to the shareholders. 
As per Spectrum's shareholders agreement (2005) the board is comprised of up to eight (8) 
directors. Furthermore, only an individual shareholder or the representative of the corporate 
shareholder may be elected or appointed to the BOD. A director shall be required to hold at 
least 5% of the voting common shares in the authorized capital of Spectrum, either 
individually or through a company controlled directly by such director. 
Spectrum's BOD meets usually once per month in Prince George, or via conference call to 
reduce travel and accommodation costs. Further, depending on the time of year and which 
projects are currently ongoing it is simply not possible for every shareholder and director to 
meet, in person, on all occasions. This is due to the logistics of the ongoing projects and may 
results in BOD meetings only occurring every second month. 
Each director who is entitled to vote at the BOD meeting has and may exercise in the 
aggregate one (1) vote for each voting common share held by the shareholder. In essence, 
voting on motions is tabulated by share ownership, whereby 50% plus 1% (simple majority) 
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is needed for most motions to be ratified. Certain matters require unanimous consent by 
directors for motions to proceed. Some examples include, annual operating and capital 
budgets, business plans, purchases over $50,000, any change in the authorized signing 
officers of the company, changes in senior management, declaration of any bonuses and 
incentives, borrowing of over $100,000, loans of over $10,000, amendments to the Notice of 
Articles, winding up and liquidation of the company and redemption, repurchase and 
retirement of any shares. 
• Each director is paid a nominal hourly rate for their time preparing for BOD meetings 
and for attendance. 
The officers of Spectrum are appointed by the BOD on an annual basis immediately 
following the annual general meeting. These officers include the Chief Executive Officer, 
the President and the Vice-President. The responsibilities associated with each position are 
below: 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
- Chairs the Board Meetings, takes and distributes minutes. 
- Oversees management and helps formulate policy, direction, compliance and actively 
ensures that there is a plan in place to follow these initiatives. 
- Manages the support services for Spectrum (Shop/Warehouse/Finance & 
Accounting/Administration, Safety & Human Resources). 
- Oversees all departments and Department Coordinators. 
- Facilitates the Project Managers in the most effective and efficient management of 
resources (physical and employees). 
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- Acts as the spokesperson, communication and knowledge hub of the company in 
relation to global company objectives and day to day operations. 
- Acts as a leading organizational force, providing guidance, priorities and leadership 
to Spectrum's support staff and systems, the backbone ofthe operation. 
- Keeps the long term goals of the company in sight and on path, so that the other 
company principles can focus on the current operations and priorities. 
- Acts as the financial and operational gatekeeper, ensuring that all aspects of the 
company stay on budget and on target, as determined by the BOD. 
The CEO is paid an annual salary above the average of the base wages of all the other owner-
managers of the company. Also, the CEO is paid an ROI of his investment, plus a portion 
that is equivalent to his shareholding of the net profits and gross margins of the company in 
that particular fiscal year. 
President 
- Political Force for company in consultation with the CEO. 
Executive authority when the CEO is unavailable, especially m the immediate 
response to a crisis. 
- Acts as a resource and mentor for Project Managers and Supervisors. 
- Keeps the CEO and the BOD apprised in regards to all political issues and matters, as 
they relate to Spectrum. 
• The President is paid a nominal hourly rate similar to directors. The hourly rate is the 
equivalent to what Project Managers are paid for their time in running projects. 
• There is no budget set for carrying out these responsibilities. 
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Vice President 
Assists the President as a Political Force for company as in consultation with the 
CEO 
Executive authority when the CEO or President is unavailable, especially in the 
immediate response to a crisis 
- Acts as a resource and mentor for Project Managers and Supervisors 
- Assists the President in keeping the CEO and the BOD apprised in regards to all 
political issues and matters as they relate to Spectrum 
• The Vice President is paid a nominal hourly rate for their duties, which is the same 
rate as the President. The hourly rate is the same as all other project managers are 
paid for their time in running projects. 
• There is no budget set for carrying out these responsibilities. 
Spectrum's BOD meetings are primarily manager meetings with much of the focus on 
logistics, work progress, resource allocation and other day to day activities. No other Project 
Managers or support services managers, other than those that are directors, are invited to 
participate in these meetings. Furthermore, Spectrum seldom has other operational meetings 
collectively with all Project Managers (shareholders or not) to discuss operational 
efficiencies, strategies and resource allocations. Other meetings that do occur are primarily 
individually project based where contract specifics are discussed amongst workers regarding 
operational practices, efficiencies, safety and logistics. 
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Current Management Structure 
Managers within Spectrum are organized in two fundamental areas, and each area reports 
directly to the CEO as illustrated in Appendix 3. These include: 
1. Support Services and Operational Departments 
2. Operations (Project Managers) 
Support Services 
Support services are provided centrally from Prince George to all Project Managers and 
Supervisors by means of four Support Services Departments and five Operating Procedure, 
Policy and Strategic Development Departments (Department Coordinators). Support 
Services departments include: 
1. Finance and Accounting 
2. Physical Resources 
3. Human Resources and Administration 
4. Occupational Health and Safety 
The pnmary responsibility of each of these departments is to facilitate the operational 
activities of Spectrum on a day to day basis. Also, these departments act as a resource for 
information regarding equipment, vehicle, labour issues, Workers Compensation, payroll, 
budgeting, finance and other related disciplines. Support Services Departments also take on 
audit functions to ensure compliance by Project Managers to all laws and regulations, and 
moreover, ensure conformance to Spectrum's internal policies and procedures. 
• All of Spectrum's support service managers are paid annual salaries with a subjective 
annual bonus, primarily based on the overall profitability of Spectrum for that current 
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period (year), and to a lesser extent their individual performance. No performance 
targets are set prior to any support service manager bonuses, merely a subjective 
evaluation by the BOD. These resemble behaviour based contracts. 
Operational Departments 
Revenue generating departments and subsequent Coordinators for those departments 
(Department Coordinators) exist for all of the primary service types which Spectrum 
provides to clients. These operational service departments include: 
1. Forestry and Industrial Vegetation Management 
2. Forest Health and Entomology 
3. Stand Tending and Fire Mitigation 
4. Reforestation 
5. Technical Forestry 
Each Department Coordinator is responsible for tracking general industry trends within the 
respective service type, including competitor activities, competitive opportunities and threats 
and changes to governmental and client policies and procedures. Operating procedures are 
developed by each of the Department Coordinators for each respective service type. This 
includes collecting data on operational success and failures by each of the Project Managers 
and other staff members, while ensuring that best practices are utilized throughout the 
department. The Department Coordinator is the knowledge hub and "go to" person for the 
department. 
Department Coordinators are to submit annual budgets for anticipated revenues and expenses 
for the coming year based on projects already under contract and potential work. This 
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includes training and education requirements, professional development, marketing (viewing 
and bidding) and research and development expenses. 
Yearly, the Department Coordinator is to update the corporate resume to ensure information 
is current regarding completed projects, client information and references. 
Department Coordinators are also responsible for compiling feedback on project performance 
from clients on areas of opportunity for improvement, coordinate scheduling requirements 
for the upcoming season, and draft a work plan for the upcoming year. This includes 
ensuring workers within the department are trained and certified appropriately and that 
proper orientation occurs. Further, the Department Coordinator is to synchronize the work 
plan with support services to ensure that both physical and human resource requirements are 
met and an action plan put in place to deal with any deficiencies well in advance of the 
season commencement. Appendix 4 illustrates a job description for a Department 
Coordinator. 
• Department Coordinators are also usually a Project Manager with a deep expertise 
from operating within that industry for a long time. Further, they are paid a nominal 
hourly rate for their work associated with coordinating the departments activities 
listed above. There is no bonus or incentive based pay for these Coordinators. 
• This position does not carry much authority, but is more of an administrative 
component to support the Project Managers and Supervisors. 
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Project Managers 
Project Managers are responsible for generating revenue, contract completion and client 
services. Furthermore, most of these Project Managers are also shareholders and directors, 
however some are just employees. The division of clients within Spectrum is loosely 
regionally based with one Project Manager servicing all of the clients within a particular 
area. Some of Spectrum's Project Managers have developed specific expertise or credentials 
that enable them to cross-pollinate with other divisions and areas. Thus, a Project Manager 
may work in conjunction with another Project Manager in completing projects or may work 
across organization and geographical boundaries. 
Project Managers assume many other responsibilities other than just generating revenue. 
This includes, scheduling, work progress, employee development, training, budgeting, 
invoicing, crew movements, payroll, marketing, client development, compliance and 
conformance. They coordinate all activities through the CEO, support services and the 
Department Coordinator. They are a multi-tasking, self-motivated and go-getters. 
Shareholder/Director Project Managers 
Each Project Manager acts as a profit center with costs and revenues tracked by project; 
remuneration is constructed by way of a salary draw as a base. That is to say, Project 
Managers are paid hourly or receive day-rates, which is reconciled to a salary. Then, 
annually, the Project Manager receives a return based on their shareholdings (Return on 
Investment) and the remainder of their compensation is based on the gross margin and net 
profit of the projects overseen. Appendix 5 illustrates the job description for a Project 
Manager and Appendix 7 details the owner-manager remuneration. 
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Project Managers oversee anywhere from 0 to 6 or 7 projects at one time. These projects can 
be across the Operational Departments, and moreover, can be geographically dispersed over 
a large area. 
Non-Shareholder/Director Project Managers 
The responsibilities of these non-owner Project Managers are similar to the owner-manager 
listed above and in Appendix 5. Several differences exist that clearly separate these Project 
Managers, even though the job descriptions are the same. First, is in terms of compensation, 
which will be delineated below. Second is hierarchy, whereby owner-managers have 
preferential claims to clients and contracts over non-owner managers. Third, also relates to 
hierarchy, in the sense the non-owner managers are not privy to all information. As 
illustrated earlier, only directors who are Project Managers are entitled to attend senior 
management meetings. Last to consider is the availability of resources, where owner-
managers are given preferential access to the best people and equipment over non-owner 
Project Managers. 
Some examples of how these Non-Owner Project Managers are compensated include: 
• Annual salary with subjective bonus at year end. Bonus is paid in part by the 
profitability of the company, and secondly by a subjective evaluation by the BOD. 
• Salary Draw (hourly and day rates) with bonus at year end. Bonus is paid in part by 
the profitability of the company, and secondly by a subjective evaluation by the BOD. 
• Salary Draw (hourly and day rates) with profit share of projects overseen. Profit 
share varies from 1.5% to 2.0% of the net profit of each project. 
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Supervisors 
Supervisors work under the direction of Project Managers and run a project on the ground 
day to day, and furthermore are onsite with the workers at all times. Supervisors oversee 
crews ranging in size from 5 to 65 workers depending on the project size and scope. 
Supervisors' primary responsibilities include; setting piece-rate prices, crew scheduling, 
work progress, logistics, training, safety, compliance, coordinating physical resource 
requirements and movements and employee development. 
• Supervisors are generally a paid piece rate. By piece rate, they are paid a percentage 
of the earnings of their respective crews. Being that quite often a supervisor is in 
control of the piece-rate to be distributed to the employees, the supervisor has a direct 
affect on their own pay by keeping wages on the high end of the range to workers. 
• Supervisors are occasionally paid a piece-rate with profit share on the project they are 
supervising, albeit this is rare. 
• Some supervisors are paid a flat hourly rate, day rate or salary draw. 
• All supervisors are subject to annual bonuses largely based on the overall profitability 
of Spectrum and a subjective determination by the BOD. 
Occasionally, Project Managers provide budgets for Supervisors to assist in allocating 
resources and expenses on projects. Generally, the highest expense on most projects is the 
direct employee wages, accounting for upwards of 65% of total costs. Employee wages can 
vary significantly depending on the level of difficulty of a particular project, which cannot 
always be forecast by Project Managers upfront. Further, most employees are paid piece-rate 
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pay to act as an incentive to work harder. This variability leaves much room for subjectivity 
in Supervisors utilizing budgets to allocate wages to workers. 
As illustrated over this section, Spectrum has grown, and moreover, diversified into several 
industries providing a multitude of services with a vast supply of resources, both human and 
physical capital. This growth and diversity has caused strain on the governance mechanisms 
within the company, whereby appropriate decision making and responsibilities have become 
clouded. 
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Chapter 4 Analysis & Modifications 
Spectrum's existing corporate governance procedures and management alignment is complex 
due to the fact that shareholders are directors, and moreover, directors are managers. Further 
complicating this issue is that other managers exist who are neither shareholders nor directors 
and which include Project, Supervisors, Department Coordinators and Support Service 
Managers. Therefore, to conduct a constructive analysis so that appropriate modifications can 
be recommended, the analysis must include not only a principal-agent theoretical framework, 
but also the incorporation of incentive, role definition/clarification and board alignment to 
shareholders. The following pages will incorporate the literature research of this project with 
Spectrum's governance and operational practices. This will be followed by a number of 
recommended modifications to the existing structure. 
Shareholders 
The shareholders at Spectrum, m a practical sense, have not separated the intent of the 
manager and director positions. Furthermore, while a shareholder agreement exists, the term 
shareholder and director have been used synonymously within Spectrum. As Yates (2006) 
illustrated, the fact that one is a shareholder does not mean that the shareholder owns the 
corporation or its assets; in a legal sense, the shareholder only has control over the 
corporation through voting, which is, primarily, the election of its directors. 
Therefore, problems relating to the entitlement of owners can be minimized by separating 
shareholders and directors, by utilizing the above legal definition as not only a legal 
distinction but also as a theoretical and philosophical foundation. As investors, the 
shareholders, who are working owners, need to elect the most effective and representative 
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BOD. The BOD focus should be to not only maximize profits, take calculated risks and 
provide guidance to the company's managers, but also ensure that all stakeholders are 
considered when formulating motions and implementing decisions. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrated that agency costs exist between the owner and its 
agent. However, Kim and Nofsinger (2007) also demonstrated that if you have inside 
ownership, the inside owners are more predisposed to focus on the performance of the 
company, and less on the manipulation of corporate resources and policies for their own gain. 
So, whether the Spectrum shareholder is actually a director or not, there are significant 
benefits to the company for having shareholders, who are also managers. Consequently, in 
Spectrum's situation, the existing owner-manager framework lends itself to a healthy sense 
of altruism in which the company can benefit. Conversely, Kim and Nofsinger (2007) 
illustrated this same sense of self-sacrifice cannot necessarily be reflected in the non-
shareholder managers. 
The selection of Spectrum shareholders over the past 15 years, for the most part, has only 
been from the operational (revenue generating) managers and supervisors of the company. 
There has never been a share offer to any Support Service Manager, Department Coordinator 
or other employees within the company. 
The selection process has largely been a subjective evaluation by the existing shareholders 
based on the candidate's experience and expertise developed within the company. There is 
no formal process within the shareholders agreement or other corporate documents that 
renders a candidate eligible to obtain share ownership. Furthermore, there is no statement of 
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qualifications required, seniority level attained, educational requirements and managerial 
level that needs to be obtained to be eligible for share ownership. 
Spectrum share offers to new or existing shareholders have only come from the divesting of 
existing shareholders, usually for retirement reasons. Issuance of new shares to either 
increase the shareholders and/or to increase the capital for investment purposes has never 
occurred or been explored for suitability. 
Currently, the owner-managers are compensated from a complicated matrix based on the 
amount of the shares a shareholder owns and, secondly, from the owner-manager's 
performance. Appendix 7 illustrates the following formula: 
• Shareholders receive a return on investment (ROI) which loosely resembles a return 
on the preferred shares held, set annually at a rate above prime interest. This return 
is generally in the neighborhood of 7% ROI (based on the value of the company), 
which is usually about 20% to 25% of earnings before taxes (EBT) from the current 
fiscal. 
• Shareholders are then compensated a ROI based on their common share ownership at 
a rate which equals about 45% of EBT from the current fiscal. 
The total compensation of the owner-managers, based on share ownership only, has 
traditionally been upwards of 70% of the total profit per fiscal year. Therefore, this means 
only 30% of the profits (before taxes) are available to reward Project Managers for their 
performance. To add, for the most part, only the owner-managers and not the non-owner 
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managers are eligible to receive a performance based profit share based on the net profits and 
contributing margins of the jobs they oversee. 
This incentive structure within Spectrum for the owner-managers, according to Eisenhardt 
(1989) is largely behaviorally based and to a lesser extent outcome-based. This is 
exemplified by the fact that 70% of the company's profits are paid out solely on share 
ownership and only 30% of profits are paid out based on the actual performance outcome of 
the owner-managers. In other words, the incentive to invest is very high but to perform is 
very low, which seems to contradict the research. This remuneration structure can result in 
potentially shirking and free-rider problems of owner-manager responsibilities to others who 
might be forced to carry the load of generating income for the company. This was 
commonly mentioned in employee owned business research by Bradley, Estin and Taylor 
(1990) whereby the fractional benefit of one owner/employee's effort desired by the 
company does not match the incentive structure, which results in shirking and free riding of 
one's responsibilities. 
Management 
Whether an owner-manager sits on Spectrum's BOD or not, it is imperative that managers be 
integrated into the strategy development of Spectrum. Brunninge, Nordqvist and Wiklund 
(2007) argued that in owner-manager firms it is crucial that the top management team 
(TMT), along with the directors, work together to formulate strategies. TMT's have the 
benefit of being closely integrated to react to competitor threats and environmental pressures, 
and can be the conduit to the CEO in developing good strategy. For Spectrum, the TMT 
should include Project Managers, senior Support Service Managers and Department 
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Coordinators. Furthermore, this delineates BOD versus management responsibilities and 
enables the BOD to focus on leading management, which keeps the company's fiduciary and 
statutory obligations intact. 
Managers (Project, Support Service and Department Coordinators) need to have their 
incentives properly aligned. This includes both managers who are shareholders and 
managers who are not. 
As supported earlier by Eisenhardt's (1989) research, Spectrum's Support Services positions 
including, Human Resources, Occupational Health and Safety, Accounting/Finance and 
Physical Resources all resemble behaviorally based occupations. Creating incentive 
structures for these departments must align with behaviorally based performance. For that 
reason, continuing with salary based pay for these types of occupations is preferred over 
initiating outcome based pay. Yet, Spectrum should explore other methods to incentivize 
these types of occupations other than just subjective year-end bonuses. This may include 
setting budgets, cost cutting recommendations, performance targets and benchmarking for 
results. 
Kim and Nofsinger (2007) illustrated that monitoring, in the context of having policies and 
procedures in place to manage these behaviorally based managers, is also important to 
scrutinize behaviour. Spectrum's monitoring should be overseen by the CEO with assistance 
from outside stakeholders. These outside stakeholders should include external experts such 
as accountants, lawyers and bankers for Spectrum's Accounting and Finance Manager, 
suppliers and outsourcers for the Physical Resource Manager, the Workers Compensation 
Board, and Human Rights and Labour Standards for the Human Resource Manager and 
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Occupational Health and Safety Coordinator. Each stakeholder can assist the CEO in 
providing feedback and monitoring of Spectrum's Support Service Managers performance. 
Next, in revtewmg the Department Coordinators duties, the behaviorally structured 
compensation method, as it currently exists, does not appear to be working functionally. 
Simply, there is limited incentive to be a Department Coordinator, other than prestige, which 
has resulted in inconsistent performance and sub-standard results. 
From reviewing the job responsibilities for Department Coordinators, which was covered in 
Chapter 3 and is detailed in Appendix 6, there are a number of administrative type functions 
that are necessary in running these departments. These duties could be completed more 
suitably by Support Services under the direction of the Department Coordinators. Therefore, 
administrative functions, where applicable, should be delegated elsewhere but still overseen 
by the Department Coordinator. 
Other duties require higher expertise and management level decision making by a senior, 
more experienced manager. For example, such higher-end duties include, tendering, 
scheduling, marketing and more; these responsibilities must remain with the Department 
Coordinator. At the same time, there needs to be more suitable incentives established to 
make the position more attractive. This would result in more consistent performance and 
better results. Coupling a performance based pay with an outcome based contract should be 
integrated into this position. This will not only incentivize the Department Coordinator to 
the overall performance and outcome of the department but also motivate them to oversee the 
coordination of projects, strategy formulation, benchmarking and to facilitate day to day 
activities. 
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Both the CEO and other Project Managers should monitor the position of Department 
Coordinator. This can occur in the form of evaluating the availability of resources, 
administrative support, structure, budgeting and other methods that would assist Project 
Managers to perform their jobs more efficiently. 
Next, the Project Managers, who are the revenue generating operations managers for 
Spectrum, can be categorized into Project Managers who own shares, and those who do not. 
As illustrated earlier, there is a contradiction in how these managers are being compensated, 
and ultimately incentivized in performing their jobs. 
Whether a Project Manager owns shares or not, there should not be a drastic difference in 
how they are compensated. In either case, these jobs within Spectrum resemble Eisenhardt's 
(1989) principal-agent stream, and furthermore, these managers need to have outcome based 
pay as the basis of their compensation. Outcome based pay provides an incentive that 
appropriately aligns their /job/ to the company's goals. It is however important to note, as 
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2003) illustrated, that inside owner risk levels are different 
because they do not have the ability to hold diversified portfolios. In essence, Spectrum's 
owner-managers evaluate the risk of projects not only according to the opportunity for profit 
but also by other factors that relate to their ability to influence strategy, exercise authority 
and choose projects. Project Managers who are not owners are thus more likely to take risks 
as they have the opportunity to hold diversified portfolios outside of Spectrum. 
Consequently, Spectrum needs to consider this background contextual information when 
allocating incentives to Project Managers. 
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As 70% of Spectrum's profit is currently paid to the owner-managers, regardless of their 
individual performance, this framework needs review. Supported by Eisenhardt's (1989) 
research on outcome based performance pay, Spectrum needs to re-consider how it is 
compensating its Project Managers. Spectrum needs to emphasize the performance outcome 
by aligning the proper incentives with the goals of the company. Furthermore, Project 
Managers that do not have shares must have similar incentives to encourage them to generate 
business and provide growth for the company. Yet, Spectrum should consider Schulze, 
Lubatkin, and Dino's (2003) diversified portfolio and risk tolerance research. 
Shareholders of Spectrum should receive a significant return on their investment, especially 
when considering the level of risk associated with Spectrum's core forestry business. 
However, the Project Managers who actually generate the revenue and service the business 
contacts, and moreover, utilize their expertise to oversee the projects, need to have more 
representative incentives to reduce agency conflict and the associated costs. 
The last level of management that needs to be reviewed includes Spectrum's Supervisors 
who run the projects on the ground and none of which are currently shareholders. Of all of 
Spectrum's management levels the inconsistency in compensation for Supervisors is the most 
controversial and results in significant agency costs. Supervisors should not be compensated 
by a system that enables them to first, control the piece-rate paid to workers, and second, 
receive a piece-rate themselves that correlates to the amount that they pay the workers. This 
conflict of interest resembles Boivie and others' (2009) research, in which the authors 
illustrated, that leaders will act as self-interested players that use corporate policies and 
resources to benefit their personal needs and goals. This is to the detriment of not only 
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Spectrum as an entity, but its shareholders and stakeholders. Spectrum needs to rethink its 
methods of compensating Supervisors by aligning the incentives offered with the goals of the 
company. 
Board of Directors 
The term shareholders and directors within Spectrum have been utilized, for the most part, 
interchangeably. Spectrum, while electing a CEO, has still used a relatively flat ownership 
structure. Moreover, it has utilized board meetings for essentially management purposes of 
strategic discussion, work progress reports and resource allocation (human and physical). 
Research from the literature review emphasizes splitting the roles of directors and 
management as, legally and operationally, their duties and responsibilities are dissimilar. 
Spectrum's board could be made effective by being smaller with a more focused scope. 
Fiegener and others (2000) found that, on average, for smaller private corporations the 
average board size was 4.6 members, yet Spectrum currently utilizes 8 directors. A smaller 
Spectrum board will advantageously facilitate consensus on management issues, policy, 
strategy and operational direction. Kim and Nofsinger (2007) indicated that smaller boards 
assist when dealing with free-rider problems, and additionally, enable directors to focus on 
higher end decision making such as major operating proposals and global financial decisions. 
A smaller Spectrum BOD would enable the shareholders to hold the directors accountable 
through reelection and decrease the possibility of the BOD of becoming entrenched. Also, 
the directors will be more answerable for the firm's performance because the directors will 
be under the scrutiny of the shareholders, who are all working owners themselves. 
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Shareholders, through their election of directors, need to ensure that the BOD prioritizes the 
hiring of top management, makes major financial decisions, provides expert advice to 
management, and ensures timely and accurate reporting back to the shareholders. 
Additionally, the BOD should focus on setting and enforcing company policy and procedures 
and, as managing directors themselves, they should lead by example for junior shareholders, 
managers, supervisors and employees. 
Huse (1994) illustrated the importance of independence, in the context of a large public 
company, as an important component in protecting the shareholders and stakeholders. 
However in Spectrum' s case, it is not practical at this point to elect outside directors, nor is it 
needed to ensure good governance. Conversely, Spectrum should focus on incorporating a 
participatory board with the focus on monitoring and supporting their managers. To add, 
Spectrum needs to also consider and protect its stakeholders, with the shareholder being the 
most important. 
Spectrum BOD should rece1ve a behaviorally based compensation system that is 
commensurate with the time invested and actions required to fulfill the responsibilities as 
directors. The current compensation system is not founded on any detailed duties; 
furthermore, it is not adequate for the responsibility required of such a position. 
CEO/PresidentNice President 
Spectrum's board should empower the CEO to provide the vision and direction for the 
company, hire top management and lead the company. Gabrielsson, Huse and Minichilli 
(2007) argued the importance for the CEO to oversee and lead the day to day operations by 
55 
guiding the firm's employees. Spectrum's CEO must make and implement decisions but also 
take direction from the BOD. 
Currently, Spectrum's CEO acts as the operational gatekeeper and also chairs the 
board/management meetings. The literature provides conflicting research as to whether the 
CEO should hold the Chairman of the Board title as well as be the Chief Executive Officer. 
On one hand, separating the two roles provides clarity, transparency and accountability for 
the company. Conversely, Elson (2004) illustrated that dual centres of authority can 
compromise the CEO's ability to oversee the organization resulting in splintering and 
discipline issues. Furthermore, Elson (2004) noted that, more important than who actually 
chairs the board meetings, it is the construction of the actual BOD, the details of their tasks 
and follow-through that is important to remember. 
Because Spectrum represents a relatively small enterprise and is closely held by the 
ownership group, separating the roles of the CEO and Chairman is likely not a practical or 
necessary alternative. However, this determination should be left to Spectrum's BOD to 
decide upon. 
Spectrum currently does not incorporate their senior management (unless an owner-manager) 
into strategy formation and high level decision making. Spectrum's CEO must set the vision 
but at the same time incorporate all senior managers into strategy formation to provide 
guidance on issues such as reacting to environmental conditions and competitor threats. 
What is more, the TMT can provide direction on strategies for growth, including both 
vertical and horizontal integration opportunities. 
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The President and Vice President of Spectrum carry reasonably clear roles and 
responsibilities. In a strategic sense, both of these roles focus on the external political 
alignment of Spectrum with industry associations. This includes participating and sitting on 
boards and committees, attending conferences and being a spokesperson for these activities 
and reporting back to the CEO and the BOD. Furthermore, the President and Vice President 
assist the CEO in operations when required, and act on behalf of the CEO in his absence. 
Overall this can be regarded as an effective structure as it currently exists; yet, creating 
budgets and outlining the strategic direction needs to be incorporated on a yearly basis to 
maximize value for the company and its shareholders. 
Compensation for the position of CEO should be a combination of behavioral and outcome 
based performance pay. Spectrum's CEO is bound by many behavioral tasks in the 
management of the company including human resources, finance and physical resource 
allocation. Yet, the CEO is also the leader in guiding the Project Managers in generating 
revenue and operating activities which are outcome based roles. 
Spectrum's President and Vice-President positions need to incorporate the values of 
behavioral based performance pay. This should include an annual salary that IS 
commensurate with the time and effort required to fulfill the duties as directed by the BOD. 
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Chapter 5 Recommendations 
The following bullet points illustrate recommendations that Spectrum's BOD and 
management can consider to modify their existing structure and procedures. These 
recommendations include, but are not limited to: 
• Within Spectrum's shareholders agreement, the company should delineate the duties, 
measures and privileges of the shareholder from the director, in that it is more readily 
understood. For example, 
o Separating duties will assist with free-rider and entitlement issues 
o Clarify roles and responsibilities of the director and shareholder specifically 
• Spectrum, its shareholders and directors need to assemble a "code of conduct" that 
will act as a guide for owner/manager behaviour, expectations and performance 
measures. As it currently exists, there are no benchmarks or policies for hours 
expected, holiday allowance, revenue minimums, commitment levels, professional 
growth, marketing and other items that define the boundaries of owner-manager 
behaviours. By developing this "code of conduct", the owner-managers of the 
company will have a clearer understanding of the dedication level required to the 
company, its shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. 
• Spectrum should look at widening its shareholder base not only for capital and 
corporate growth, but to increase manager and employee development, retention, 
loyalty and performance. 
• Explore the addition of new shareholders who are not just revenue generating 
supervisors and managers, but long term key individuals. 
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• Contemplate issuing new capital to increase the capital reserves for investment 
purposes and make room for new shareholders mainly for succession planning. 
• Re-align the profit share structure to put more emphasis on incentivizing the 
managers appropriately. Increase the outcome performance based pay overall from 
30% of total profit to a minimum of 50%. This modification will enable the company 
to improve the compensation structure for several layers of management, while still 
providing sufficient return to its shareholders. Specifically; 
o Provide performance targets for support service managers and initiate 
behaviorally based incentives, 
o Increase the compensation for Department Coordinators and include both an 
outcome based performance pay structure, based on the profitability of the 
department, with a behaviorally based salary, 
o Standardize how Supervisors are being compensated throughout the company, 
and also, utilize outcome based performance pay tied to a budget, production 
of crews, and profit, but not on workers' piece-rates, 
o Standardize Project Manager pay throughout the company, considering both 
the owner-managers and non-owner managers. Incorporate outcome based 
performance pay and reduce, or potentially eliminate, behavior based hourly 
pay all together. This latter point would focus Project Managers more on 
marketing, generating revenue and growth, and less on administrative tasks 
and minimize shirking to other owner-managers. 
• Consider a reduced BOD to focus on corporate policy, strategic direction, hire top 
management, make financial decisions, and keep the fiduciary and statutory duties 
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intact. The smaller the BOD the more accountable it will be to the shareholders, and 
moreover, the less entrenched it can become. 
• Develop a director's code with emphasis on duty of supervision, care, diligence, skill, 
disclosure, statutory and fiduciary obligation. 
• The CEO needs to include all of the senior managers into the operational and strategy 
decision making within the company. This includes having more management 
meetings and separating BOD meetings completely. 
• Normalize budget setting by all levels of management, with the prominent focus on 
superior planning and financial management. This is especially important in 
situations where the BOD and/or the CEO is investing the shareholders capital for 
items such as political involvement, Corporate Social Responsibility and external 
association related activities. 
• As with the Department Coordinators, set eliminating redundancy and increasing 
efficiency across the company to be at the forefront of all management and 
department levels. 
• Document actual monitoring practices so that monitoring of staff becomes the norm. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Areas for Future Research 
Spectrum is a diverse, geographically dispersed, private, small to medium sized enterprise. 
Spectrum has a varied but distinct ownership and management structure that resembles a 
mixture of business types in style, configuration and size. Spectrum's uniqueness cannot be 
explained fully in these few pages of analysis and recommendations. However, the company 
faces many challenges that are consistent among many entities with regard to shareholder, 
director and manager separation and responsibilities. 
Regardless of whether a manager or director owns the shares of a company, agency theory 
and its associated costs are still relevant. This was evident in family businesses, private 
business, small to medium sized enterprises and employee owned companies. The literature 
confirms that the way to reduce agency costs is to align the incentives for managers 
appropriately considering the type of work they are performing, all the while, keeping the 
consideration of the shareholders and stakeholders at the forefront. In Spectrum's case, this 
means altering the pay structure for its Project Managers and Supervisors. Further, it also 
signifies that the company should continue with behaviorally based pay for its Support 
Service Managers and incorporating changes to the companies Department Managers. 
Boards of Directors are more accountable and perform better when they are smaller in size. 
By making Spectrum's BOD smaller, it will enable the directors to focus on holding 
management accountable and keeping the vision and long term strategy intact. Furthermore, 
it will enable the CEO and management to focus on the here and now and lead the company 
on a day to day basis. 
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As this project unfolded, it became evident that there are other areas of research that could 
have been incorporated, or can be explored in subsequent research. For example, further 
study could include observing how professional partnerships and organizations function in 
regards to corporate governance and management structure. This could include lawyers and 
accounting practices, and furthermore engineering and other consulting type firms. 
In the future, further investigation of specific board tasks can be conducted, including 
examples of duties, authority parameters and expectations. Also, areas other than agency 
theory could be delved into as the basis for similar research such as organizational theory, 
corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory. Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 could be looked at for relevance to similar sized private enterprises in regards to 
protecting shareholders and stakeholders from suspect management practices and enact 
stronger accountability on companies' directors and managers5 . 
5 http: //www.sox law.com 
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Appendix 1 Revenue Centres British Columbia 
----
Scale 
50 0 50 100 150 200 kilom otr .. 
....._ ____ ___, 
66 
Operating Areas 
• Northeast (Peace) 
• roc~lleallh & f. rlomOiogy 
~Of liSt MtJOOgE!mtnl 
• FO(C ... ...tl)l Ve>QC.1al:!on M3f'liJ9C·mont 
e 1nduotf131 Vt'9<'(onon ManOQOITlon1 e RofOfllsladlon 
e SlantJ 1 em.l•ug 
Central 
e Foro<! Hoolh & Entomology 
Fo~t M3nagcmcnt 
• r orec.try VegetM!on MMAg&ment 
e lodustnal Ve~t~ton MEJuagemtrrt 
• l ~ iiOri!altA I «XI 
• stondTcnclf'oCJ 
Cariboo/Okanagan 
e ForC'Ot Hoallh &. Entomoi09Y 
ForC!it Milll39omcnt 
• r ()(tstry Vegebtlon Mo\VU!Igement 
e lndu!llflul Vtpetahon MBOC~Qemert 
• 11•f0!0>t1lll00 
• Stond TOndlf'oC) 
• Southeast (Kootenay) 
e t- Ot~t Ht&lttl & t:.ntomok>gy 
• For~t Nhln31J''mcnt e For(IStry vooc-tat•on Marugc,mont 
a lndustrotl VegetMon Man;tgemerl 
• 11•f<lf.5hll10tl 
e Stand 1 illdiiJIIJ 
Lower Mainland 
e r orost l lollllh & rntomology 
F Ote l:lt Manegeme1t 
e F OfO':Jry Vcoctauon MBnaocmcnt 
e lrdv..tnal V<QOtabon Monogo"""" ' 
~· Refontstabon 
• SLHrld I flndrnfJ 
Appendix 2 Revenue Centres Alberta 
( 
/ 
Scale I Echelle 
75 0 75 150 225 
km km ._.. ...... """"--....L.--..L...----1 
67 
North 
e Forest Health & Entomology 
Forest Management 
e Forestry Vegetation Management 
e Industrial Vegetation Management 
e Reforestatioo 
e Stand Tending 
- Central West e Forest Health & Entomology 
Forest Management 
e Forestry Vegetation Management 
e Industrial Vegetat1on Management 
e Reforestation 
e Stand Tendmg 
Central East 
e Forest Hea~h & Entomology 
e Forest Management 
e Forestry Vegetabon Management 
e lndustnal Vegetation Management 
e Reforestabon 
e Stand T end1ng 
South 
e Forest Health & Entomology 
e Forest Management 
e Forestry Vegetation Management 
e Industrial Vegetation Management 
e Reforestation 
e Stand Tending 
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Appendix 4 Department Coordinator Job Description 
Financial: 
1) Submit annual budget for costs and revenues by December 31st for the following 
year. 
a. Revenue projections 
b. Viewing and Bidding costs 
c. Overhead Wages for the department 
d. Technology improvements and expenses 
e. Conferences to attend 
f. Training & Education 
g. Professional Development 
2) Submit an annual report to the CEO which will include: 
a. budget review 
b. work progress 
c. client feedback 
d. Opportunities for new clients or areas 
Human Resources: 
1) Coordinate training for all department specific needs and applicable employees 
2) Provide orientation, training and support to the Project Managers in relation to the 
department. 
3) Coordinate all hiring including crew allocation, crewleaders and Supervisors. 
Administration: 
1) In conjunction with the CEO and project managers submit a work progress by 
January 151h and updated monthly (to be kept up to date by CEO) for the remainder of 
the year 
a) This will occur digitally on our intranet via the Spectrum website. Bill has 
started a work progress section that each department head can update 
2) Coordinate viewing schedule for department through administration. Ensure that we 
capitalize on all opportunities. Determination of whether we should view the obscure 
opportunities must be approved by the CEO. 
3) Coordinate viewing and bidding support document library on the Marketing and 
Proposals file on the server 
4) Coordinate feedback forms/letters from clients and keep up to date on the server 
5) Be on the leading edge of the field for innovations or new ways to conduct business 
within the department 
6) Develop a "best practices" model and support documents 
7) Update the Projects section of the Company Resume monthly as pertains to the 
department 
8) Be the knowledge hub of the department 
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Appendix 5 Project Manager Job Description 
General: 
• Be the liaison with the client for all associated projects and manager all facets 
• Protect our workers and ensure that safety is at the forefront of all operations 
• Ensure compliance by employees to all laws (Federal, provincial, municipal) 
• Ensure compliance to WCB, Labour Standards, Human Rights, etc. 
• Protect Spectrum's intellectual and physical property at all times 
• Conform and ensure conformance by employees to Spectrum's Policy Manual 
• Be the company's representative to clients, the public and stakeholders 
• Keep Spectrum's best interests at the forefront of all decision making. 
Financial: 
• Submit a Project Information Sheet (PIF's) and budget before the project commences 
• Ensure Spectrum has a signed copy of the contract on file in Prince George 
• Approve Project Payroll and submit to Finance, no later than Monday @ I 2:00pm 
• Approve employee expenses and gas receipts are submitted on a bi-weekly basis. 
• Ensure that your expenses and payroll are submitted no less than on a monthly basis. 
• During, and upon completion of the project, compare budgeted costs to actual 
• Complete Invoices immediately upon completion of the project, furthermore 
complete interim Invoices where possible 
• Update Work in Progress (WIP) to Finance within 5 calendar days of month end 
• Update Work in Progress weekly if margining becomes a constraint 
• Update LIP's (Liabilities in Progress) Finance within 5 calendar days of month end 
Physical Resources: 
• Communicate vehicle and equipment requests to the Physical Resources and 
Warehouse Manager with sufficient notice. 
• Coordinate through Physical Resources all training required for equipment and 
vehicle operators. 
Human Resources & Administration 
• Ensure upon completion of the project, that the Corporate Resume is updated 
• Submit a Notice of Project goes out to Work Safe BC before the project commences 
• Ensure that clients complete a project feedback letter or form 
• Ensure that all training is complete before an employee commences work 
• Complete regular performance appraisals as per Spectrum's policy 
• Solicit employee evaluations of Spectrum and submit to Human Resources 
• Provide Human Resources with sufficient time to prepare manuals and paperwork 
required for project 
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Appendix 6 Supervisor Job Description 
General: 
• Protect the workers and ensure that safety is at the forefront of all operations 
• Ensure compliance by employees to all laws (Federal, provincial, municipal) 
• Protect Spectrum's property both intellectual and physical at all times 
• Conform and ensure conformance by employees to Spectrum's Policies 
• Be the company's representative to clients, the public and other when in the field. 
• Keep Spectrum's best interests at the forefront of all decision making 
• Submit biweekly checklist to the Project Manager 
Financial: 
• Ensure that all employees signed payroll is submitted biweekly- Monday@ I 2:00pm 
• Ensure that expenses and gas receipts are submitted on a bi-weekly basis 
• At the completion of the project, conduct a review of actual costs to budget 
Physical Resources: 
• Communicate vehicle and equipment requests to the Physical Resources Manager 
and Warehouse Manager, upon approval from the Project Manager 
• Ensure that all drivers have submitted a Drivers abstract and have shown a valid 
drivers license before assigning an employee a vehicle. 
• Coordinate through Physical Resources all training required 
Administration and Human Resources 
• Ensure that the project is included in the work progress section of the job database 
• Ensure that at the completion of the project that the Corporate Resume is current with 
the updated information 
• Ensure that a Notice of Project goes out to Work Safe BC before the project 
commences 
• Ensure that all training is complete before an employee commences work 
• Ensure that the training matrix is current and a copy is available at all times 
• Ensure that employee cessation forms are completed before termination and all 
equipment is handed back to physical resources 
• Provide crew-lists to Human Resources prior to commencement of every project 
Safety: 
• Ensure that there is applicable Level I and III Occupational First Aid attendants for 
the project 
• Have an excellent knowledge and understanding of Spectrum's Occupational Health 
and Safety Plan 
• Ensure that regular safety meetings and briefings are completed by employees 
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